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Happiness measures, like any decisionmaking criteria, will not 
reside in sterile vacuums, but rather will thrive within policymaking 
institutions. Appreciating the dynamics within and between these 
bodies thus can help to illuminate further dimensions of the 
subjective well-being (SWB) debate. This Commentary seeks to bring 
those institutional considerations to the foreground. Its principal 
argument is that happiness measures necessarily implicate issues of 
deep disagreement that must be resolved by legitimate actors and 
procedures before such measures can be implemented. Given the 
current lack of methodological consensus, individual agencies should 
thus experiment with such measures in discrete rulemakings when the 
available well-being data are robust and could usefully supplement a 
rule’s cost-benefit analysis (CBA). Only then, through learning and 
experience, should other government actors consider 
institutionalizing happiness measures through their respective 
processes and governing texts.1 Each stage of this dynamic process, in 
turn—within agencies, the executive branch, Congress, and the 
courts—promises distinct sources of information and legitimacy. 
The articles, Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis2 and 
Happiness Surveys and Public Policy: What’s the Use?,3 offer rich 
 
Copyright © 2013 by Jennifer Nou. 
 † Public Law Fellow, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Eric Posner and the 
participants in Duke Law Journal’s annual administrative law symposium for helpful questions 
and comments. 
 1. This idea draws in part on the “principle of institutional settlement” famously 
developed by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, 
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 4 
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (“The principle of institutional 
settlement expresses the judgment that decisions which are the duly arrived at result of duly 
established procedures of this kind ought to be accepted as binding upon the whole society 
unless and until they are duly changed.”). 
 2. John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being Analysis vs. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603 (2013). Though recognizing the potential for 
conceptual slipperiness, this Commentary will refer to SWB and happiness measures 
synonymously. 
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insights into many of the contentious issues endemic to SWB 
research. In the former paper, John Bronsteen, Christopher 
Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur propose a method that they call 
well-being analysis (WBA) as a “hedonized” counterpart to CBA and 
consider its operation in practice.4 Matthew Adler’s contribution is 
valuable for highlighting, among other things, the role of the 
“observer” in happiness measurement.5 Specifically, he points out 
that when observers have diverging rankings of preference profiles, 
“objective” frameworks such as measures of gross national happiness 
can only be “observer-relative.”6 Such inevitable variations, he fears, 
will lead to “arbitrary” conclusions about so-called “objective 
happiness.”7 
The potential for arbitrariness, however, should not in itself 
doom the enterprise; it counsels only that pretensions to pure 
objectivity can be shed. In their place should operate familiar and 
evolving principles of administrative law and institutional processes 
that help to ensure that such arbitrariness is appropriately cabined. 
Part I surveys potential sources of deep disagreements regarding 
SWB that prevent consensus on its policymaking role. Part II 
compares an array of institutional mechanisms for resolving those 
disagreements in the analogous context of CBA. Part III then 
explores the reasons why the best initial mechanisms for 
implementing SWB measures reside at the individual agency level, 
when they can supplement the CBA of particular rules. 
 
 3. Matthew D. Adler, Happiness Surveys and Public Policy: What’s the Use?, 62 DUKE 
L.J. 1510 (2013). 
 4. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 2, at 1617–18 (“In WBA, all effects of 
a regulation are hedonized, which is to say that they are converted into units directly measuring 
their impact on the subjective well-being of the affected parties. The positive and negative 
hedonic impacts can then be compared with one another. They are the relevant costs and 
benefits.”).  
 5. See Adler, supra note 3, at 1588 (“In short, when observers have different rankings of 
profiles, there will be no v(.) function that represents all of their rankings. Rather, the cardinal 
measurement of hedonic experience will be observer-relative.”).  
 6. Id. For example, translating such measures necessarily entails an exercise in 
interpretation and judgment: When an individual reports a happiness measure of “3” out of “6” 
for commuting, for example, reasonable minds can disagree as to whether she was expressing a 
tradeoff with time or just expressing an ordinal measure relative to socializing. Id. at 6.  
 7. Id. at 1589. 
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I.  DEEP DISAGREEMENTS 
If long-running cost-benefit debates are any indication, there are 
multiple dimensions along which SWB experts will be unlikely to find 
universal agreement in the near future.8 These areas of deep 
disagreement may arise for multiple reasons. Perhaps they implicate 
questions about the ends rather than the means of government.9 Or 
perhaps they require second-order measurement specifications that 
are essentially contestable.10 Or perhaps they require 
incommensurable tradeoffs between the monetized and 
nonmonetized, the quantitative and the qualitative. All of these 
possibilities threaten intractability for academics and government 
actors alike. At the same time, there may be deep disagreements 
about whether these disputes are even deep at all; some will argue 
that sufficient conceptual or technical refinement will reveal them to 
be quite shallow; others will remain skeptical. This Part surveys a few 
of these sources of disagreement, but there are many more. 
A. Ends, Not Means 
Whether the government should promote overall life 
satisfaction, or positive experiences, or the obtainment of objective 
goods “is a matter for substantive normative argument.”11 In other 
words, the preferred choice will likely vary by political 
administration, just as it will across countries and other jurisdictional 
units. For example, Bhutan’s work with a Gross National Happiness 
Index reflects the country’s own set of values and culture. The index 
is “distinct from the western literature on ‘happiness’” in 
“internaliz[ing] responsibility and other-regarding motivations.”12 
 
 8. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 2, at 1606 (“Despite CBA’s 
prominence . . . it has been criticized harshly from the moment it was first required by executive 
order to the present day, and countless times in between.” (citations omitted)). 
 9. See generally AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISAGREEMENT (1996) (arguing that a framework of “deliberative democracy” should guide 
moral disagreements and that this framework should be continually reevaluated in light of 
actual democratic disagreements). 
 10. See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167, 
169 (1956) ( “[T]here are concepts which are essentially contested, concepts the proper use of 
which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users”). 
 11. Adler, supra note 3, at 1523. 
 12. KARMA URA, SABINA ALKIRE, TSHOKI ZANGMO & KARMA WANGDI, CTR. FOR 
BHUTAN STUD., A SHORT GUIDE TO GROSS NATIONAL HAPPINESS INDEX 7 (2012), available 
at http://www.grossnationalhappiness.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Short-GNH-Index-
edited. pdf. 
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Because of conflicting visions of well-being and the common good, 
the appropriate anchoring concepts for SWB will similarly be the 
subject of continuing political discourse and disagreement among 
various groups and constituencies. 
B. Conceptual Buckets  
Defenders of CBA acknowledge that the dollar is an imperfect 
measure of human welfare, but press on in the belief that it is 
nevertheless the best available uniform metric.13 In its place, 
Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur propose “well-being units 
(WBUs)” that would “map[] a person’s SWB onto a scale that would 
ideally run from -10 to 10, in which 10 indicates perfect happiness 
(subjectively defined), -10 indicates perfect misery, and 0 indicates 
neutrality or the absence of experience.”14 Although this mapping 
exercise is meant to provide a uniform scale, however, the underlying 
SWB data will arise from sources containing nebulous conceptual 
categories that may result in conflicting subjective interpretations and 
thus nonrandom measurement error.15 
For instance, one major data source drawing upon the 
experience sampling method described by Bronsteen, Buccafusco and 
Masur16 is a module of questions included in the 2010 and 2012 
American Time Use Survey, which is administered by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics.17 The module asks individuals “how they experience 
[uses of] their time—specifically how happy, tired, sad, stressed, and 
in pain they felt while engaged in specific activities on the day prior to 
the interview.”18 But these various categories (“happy,” “tired,” 
“sad,” “stressed,” “in pain”) are not self-defining, overlap 
conceptually, and lack consistent connotations. 
 
 13. See EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 278 
(1978) (noting that monetary measures are “a surrogate [for welfare], of course, and an 
imperfect surrogate at that” but nevertheless arguing that it is still the best available). 
 14. Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 2, at 1618. 
 15. For a similar critique, see Todd B. Kashdan, The Assessment of Subjective Well-Being 
(Issues Raised by the Oxford Happiness Questionnaire), 36 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL 
DIFFERENCES 1225, 1225 (2004), which criticizes “[t]he operationalization of SWB by the 
[Oxford Happiness Questionnaire]” as “not based on relevant definition and theory” and 
thereby “invit[ing] nonrandom error into the study of SWB.” 
 16. Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 2, at 1622–23. 
 17. See BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING 
MODULE OF THE AMERICAN TIME USE SURVEY: ASSESSMENT FOR ITS CONTINUATION 4 
(2012), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13535. 
 18. Id.  
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While “stressed,” for example, is likely to be coded as a negative 
affect category, some research suggests that its relationship with 
affect is less than straightforward, especially in the aggregate.19 More 
generally, these conceptual buckets require judgments about affect 
categories and whether they positively or negatively relate to SWB. 
These relationships, in turn, are likely to be heterogeneous depending 
on the circumstances and remain the subject of persistent 
disagreement. This contentious dynamic will be most significant in 
situations in which regulators attempt to confront new risks that have 
never before been experienced. 
C. Hybridity 
Finally, in a world of hybrid measures, where both monetized 
costs and benefits reside alongside SWB scales, there must be 
mechanisms for adjudicating among the measures should they point 
to conflicting policy outcomes. Adler and Bronsteen, Buccafusco and 
Masur all remain ambivalent about defending hedonic measures as 
the sole basis for decisionmaking. Adler, for example, grants that 
“happiness or, more generally, mental states, are at least one 
important aspect of human flourishing,”20 while Bronsteen, 
Buccafusco and Masur acknowledge that WBA’s detachment from 
wealth implies that they “would not rule out preserving CBA as a 
complement to WBA.”21 If wide disparities between WBA and CBA 
suggest that wealth effects are the determining factor, however, then 
thorny decisions must be made regarding whether and when to 
privilege such effects. How and when to do so likely requires 
tradeoffs that cannot be resolved through technical refinement. 
 
 19. See, e.g., Weiting Ng, Ed Diener, Raksha Aurora & James Harter, Affluence, Feelings 
of Stress, and Well-Being, 94 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 257 (2009) (finding that stress correlates 
positively with well-being at the nation-level, though negatively at the individual-level); Brett 
W. Pelham, Stress and Happiness: Often, but Not Always, Related, GALLUP (Aug. 21, 2009), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/122420/stress-happiness-often-not-always-related.aspx (providing 
data indicating that states with higher stress levels sometimes have residents with higher 
happiness levels). 
 20. Adler, supra note 3, at 1520. 
 21. Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 2, at 1645; see also Anthony Vitarelli, 
Note, Happiness Metrics in Federal Rulemaking, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 115, 135–47 (2010) 
(providing examples of how hedonic approaches could supplement current regulatory-impact 
analysis). 
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II.  INSTITUTIONAL RESOLUTION 
Instead, deep disagreements about WBA will be resolved, if at 
all, through institutional procedures involving parties authorized to 
help narrow, if not settle, such disputes. Some of the existing 
mechanisms examined in this Part have been used to cabin analogous 
forms of discretion with respect to CBA and are thus instructive. 
These processes and the resulting texts help to preserve internal 
resources by not requiring the re-litigation of each potential area of 
dispute every time a new regulatory action is proposed.22 Although it 
is useful to get a sense of each institution in isolation, their interaction 
and the resulting dialogue can be illuminating as well.  
A. Congress 
Congress can preclude agencies from the consideration of costs 
for specific regulatory actions, or otherwise constrain the use of CBA, 
by specifying substantive and exclusive criteria, such as “safety” or 
standards “requisite to protect the public health.”23 Congress has also 
passed a number of cross-cutting CBA statutes that highlight the 
potential regulatory impacts on specific groups like states24 and small 
businesses25 or on environmental26 or paperwork burdens in 
particular.27 Statutes can also contain deadlines or sunset provisions 
designed to help spur agency action, revisit it at later points, or to 
retire a regulatory program altogether.28 
One way to understand these legislative requirements is as a set 
of texts that have resolved how to trade off goods, such as clean air 
 
 22. See Michael A. Livermore, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence 40 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“Once particular 
methodological disputes are settled, some inertia is likely to set in. Conflicts between OIRA and 
agencies are costly . . . .”); Cass Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Thirty-Six 
Questions (and Almost as Many Answers) 4 (Jan. 10, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2199112 (describing executive-branch 
documents that “are binding until they are changed, and for that reason, some of the hardest 
questions cannot be revisited during the process of rule review”). 
 23. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 4904(a)(2), 7409(b)(1) (2006) (discussing an “adequate margin of 
safety . . . requisite to protect the public health”).  
 24. E.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1532–1538 (2006).  
 25. E.g., Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2006).  
 26. E.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006 & 
Supp. V 2012).  
 27. E.g., Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3508 (2006).  
 28. See Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 
U. PA. L. REV. 923, 925–28, 935 (2008). 
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against the monetized costs of necessary technological or other 
requisite changes, if at all. These judgments also represent legislative 
resolutions about persistent CBA issues, including how to weigh 
particular distributional impacts or the relevant time horizons to 
consider. The process for producing such texts, however, is 
notoriously costly, with legislative gridlock and abdication serving as 
reminders of the institution’s many self-defeating internal procedures 
such as filibuster rules,29 as well as partisan incentives to avoid 
compromise altogether. As a result, codifying narrow WBA 
requirements in statutes is not only likely to be difficult as an initial 
matter, but will also be more challenging to revise in light of new data 
and methodological developments. 
B. Executive Branch 
Subject to these statutory constraints, Executive Orders 12,86630 
and 13,56331 require agencies that are not independent regulatory 
agencies32 to “assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory 
alternatives.”33 For rules that are “economically significant,” agencies 
are required to submit to the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) a more thorough CBA.34 In 2003, after a period of 
public comment and peer review, the Office of Management and 
 
 29. See generally STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE 
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 112-1, at 1–1118 (2011); 
CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF 
THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 111-157, at 333–1018 (2011).  
 30. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 
note at 745 (2006), and 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 126 (Supp. V 2012). 
 31. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012). 
 32. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. at 641, 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 746 (defining 
agencies as those defined as an agency under 44 U.S.C. § 3502(1) (2006) other than those 
defined as an “independent regulatory agency” under id. § 3502(10)). 
 33. Id. § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. at 638, 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 745; Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(a), 3 
C.F.R. at 215 (requiring “[o]ur regulatory system” to “take into account benefits and costs, both 
quantitative and qualitative”). For a discussion of other legislative and executive branch CBA 
requirements, see generally CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41974, COST-
BENEFIT AND OTHER ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS (2011). 
 34. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(B)(ii), 3 C.F.R. at 645, 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 748; see 
also Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 
126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 13), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2192639 (describing “Regulatory Impact Analysis” as “a careful 
and detailed account of the costs and benefits of economically significant rules”).  
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Budget issued Circular A-4,35 which was intended to provide guidance 
to agencies “on the development of regulatory analysis” as required 
by executive order.36 
Guidance documents like Circular A-4 are “authoritative” within 
the executive branch and will be cited and referenced as such during 
the executive-branch review process.37 They are “binding until they 
are changed, and for that reason, some of the hardest questions 
cannot be revisited during the process of rule review.”38 Some of those 
currently settled hard questions include the choice of 3 and 7 percent 
discount rates, as well as a circumscribed range for the value-of-
statistical life at between $1 and $10 million.39 Although Bronsteen, 
Buccafusco and Masur do not take a position on whether WBA 
would require discounting, they identify both reasons for and against 
its use that will likely need to be similarly resolved.40 
At the same time, Circular A-4 also leaves open other analogous 
deep disagreements, such as the use of CBA relative to other 
approaches like cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). For these, the 
document adopts a pluralistic approach, encouraging the use of both 
CBA and CEA with “multiple measures of effectiveness that offer 
different insights and perspectives,” such as quality-adjusted-life-
years.41 These multiple measures, in turn, will be adjudicated within 
particular rulemakings through an OIRA-coordinated review process 
involving other agencies and various White House entities.42 
Relative to legislative changes that require bicameralism and 
presentment, revisions to executive orders and guidance documents 
are less costly, and thus more flexible. Consequently, they are more 
adaptable to methodological advances, including the development of 
new data sources. At the same time, these authoritative texts remain 
 
 35. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4, 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
omb/assets/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf. 
 36. Id. at 1. 
 37. See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 4. 
 38. See id.; see also Livermore, supra note 22, at 40.   
 39. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 35, at 30, 33–34.  
 40. See Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 2, at 1639 n.159, 1684–88.  
 41. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 35, at 13. 
 42. See Sunstein, supra note 34, at 28 (“Questions about costs and benefits will typically 
involve a number of agencies and offices.”). 
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resource intensive to produce and revise due to the need to secure 
support from various entities within the executive branch.43 
C. Agencies 
Though the presidential review process will reference Circular 
A-4, individual agencies also issue their own CBA guidance 
documents. For these agencies, their “specific guidance governs the 
wide range of issues left open by OIRA,”44 and their documents are 
often revisited with more frequency. For example, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) currently operates under its own 272-page-
long Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses45 issued in 2010, 
which itself reflects revisions from previous years, including 1983, 
1991, 1999, and 2000.46 Independent regulatory agencies, not subject 
to presidential review, sometimes also formulate their own CBA 
guidance.47 In the wake of Business Roundtable v. SEC,48 for example, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated general 
CBA guidelines that drew in part from the broad principles of 
Circular A-4.49 
Agencies can also issue supplemental guidance about discrete 
CBA issues. Both the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the 
EPA, for example, have issued official guidance regarding the value-
of-statistical life. The DOT recently adopted a value-of-statistical life 
 
 43. Sunstein, supra note 22, at 4 (“[T]heir alteration requires some kind of formal process, 
requiring significant time, effort, and commitment from a large number of public officials, and 
perhaps a period of public comment as well.”). 
 44. See Livermore, supra note 22, at 19. 
 45. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES 1-1 
(2010), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/pages/Guidelines.html. 
 46. Id.; see also EPA Guidance, NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epalib/riaepa.nsf/8a8e79bebcf3a3a0852565a500501ed5/ 
6fb916798827ac10852567570079530b?OpenDocument (last updated Apr. 5, 2013). 
 47. See, e.g., Memorandum from Dan M. Berkovitz, Gen. Counsel, Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n, & Jim Moser, Acting Chief Economist, Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n, to Rulemaking Teams, Guidance on and Templates for Presenting Cost-Benefit 
Analyses for Commission Rulemakings 1–2 (Sept. 29, 2010), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ 
ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/oig_investigation_061311.pdf; see also Arthur 
Fraas & Randall Lutter, On the Economic Analysis of Regulations at Independent Regulatory 
Commissions 9 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper RFF DP 11-16, 2011), available at 
http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/Rff-DP-11-16_final.pdf.  
 48. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).   
 49. Memorandum from the Div. of Risk, Strategy, & Fin. Innovation of the SEC & the 
Office of Gen. Counsel of the SEC, to Staff of the Rulewriting Divs. & Offices, Current 
Guidance on Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemakings 1–4 (Mar. 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi_guidance_econ_analy_secrulemaking.shtml.   
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of $6.2 million (2011 dollars).50 The EPA, by contrast, currently 
recommends a value of $7.4 million (2006 dollars), updated to the 
year of the analysis.51 Its internal process for revising this estimate 
includes engaging with its Science Advisory Board Environmental 
Economics Advisory Committee; creating another expert panel to 
explore issues regarding the meta-analysis of the value-of-statistical 
life; commissioning reports; submitting a white paper to its advisory 
board for comments and recommendations; and, finally, 
implementing an unspecified process resulting from those 
recommendations.52 
The internal procedures through which such agency-level 
guidance documents are formulated varies by agency, but usually 
consist of some kind of “horizontal review” within the agency, 
including consultation with relevant program offices, economists, 
general counsel, and advisory groups.53 Then, to the extent necessary, 
there will be a “vertical review” up the management chain and to the 
political leadership of the office and agency, particularly when issues 
are unable to be resolved at the staff level.54 Similar processes help to 
inform the drafting of particular rules as well.55 As compared to 
legislative and executive-branch resolutions, individual agency-level 
guidance documents are the most flexible texts given that fewer 
actors are necessary to make revisions over more specific regulatory 
areas.  Agencies are thus uniquely situated to make the best use of 
SWB data and analyses as an initial matter, given that the issues 
subject to deliberation are more well-defined. 
 
 50. See Memorandum from Polly Trottenberg, Assistant Sec’y for Transp. Policy, U.S. 
Dep’t of Transp., & Robert Rivkin, Gen. Counsel, to Secretarial Officers & Modal Adm’rs, 
Guidance on Treatment of the Economic Value of a Statistical Life in Departmental 
Analyses—2011 Interim Adjustment 1 (July 29, 2011), available at 
http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.dev/files/docs/Value_ of_Life_ Guidance_ 2011_ Update_07-29-
2011.pdf. 
 51. Frequently Asked Questions on Mortality Risk Valuation, NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. 
ECON., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/ pages/ 
MortalityRiskValuation.html#whatvalue (last updated Apr. 5, 2013). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING: HOW 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 75–88 tbl.2-1 (4th ed. 2011); 
Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 
1036–40 (2011). 
 54. KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 53, at 82.  
 55. Id. 
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For proposed legislative rules, the Administrative Procedure 
Act56 also requires a period of public notice-and-comment.57 Members 
of the public can also submit their input to the agency about the ways 
in which either (1) the executive agency mediated by the OIRA-
coordinated review process or (2) the independent regulatory agency 
has resolved methodological issues for particular rules. Reinforced 
through judicial review,58 agencies must consider such comments and 
publicly explain their rationales for accepting or rejecting them 
before issuing their final rules.59 As a result, agencies will also 
potentially possess the most information about how SWB measures 
can usefully supplement the information gained through comments 
and CBA. The multiple stages of the rulemaking process—from 
advance notices of proposed rulemaking, to proposals, to 
withdrawals, to final forms—also allow agencies to gather public 
input on different formulations and data sources. 
III.  HAPPINESS INSTITUTIONS 
Given the current state of the art regarding happiness measures, 
the most promising and least costly resolution mechanisms for settling 
WBA’s inherently contentious issues reside at the individual agency 
level. Testing and piloting WBA at specific agencies and by reference 
to individual rulemakings will help to build a storehouse of 
experience with the technique.60 Some of the most robust findings in 
 
 56. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006). 
 57. Id. § 553(c) (“After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested 
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, 
views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.”). 
 58. Under Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983), “the 
agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action 
including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made,’” id. at 43 
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). Courts have 
sometimes found agency cost-benefit analyses lacking under the standard. See, e.g., Corrosion 
Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1214 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 59. See United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252–53 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 60. See Livermore, supra note 22, at 54 (“It has been agencies, not OIRA, that have taken 
the primary responsibility for developing the methodology of cost-benefit analysis and applying 
it to their particular regulatory contexts.”). Along similar lines, fruitful efforts have occurred 
with a project called Regulation Room at the DOT, resulting in very thoughtful analyses and 
data about ways to improve public participation. See generally, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Mary J. 
Newhart, Claire Cardie, Dan Cosley & Cornell eRulemaking Initiative (CeRI), Rulemaking 2.0, 
65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395 (2011); Cynthia R. Farina, Mary Newhart, Josiah Heidt & CeRI, 
Rulemaking vs. Democracy: Judging and Nudging Public Participation That Counts, 2 MICH. J. 
ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 123 (2012). 
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the happiness literature, for example, deal with the negative hedonic 
effects of commuting61 and unemployment,62 suggesting that the 
Departments of Transportation and Labor, respectively, may be 
particularly receptive agencies. More generally, SWB measures may 
be especially useful in contexts where market rigidities or cognitive 
biases render suspect more familiar approaches, such as those based 
on hedonic prices or contingent valuation.63 When there are reasons 
to believe, that is, that actual individual preferences are not well-
reflected through prices or willingness-to-pay surveys, then SWB 
measures may provide an alternative, useful metric for agencies to 
consider. 
If agencies can learn from these efforts and come to find WBA 
to be a useful tool, then these results will filter up in ways likely to 
encourage Congress or the executive branch to incorporate the 
accumulated learning into their respective processes.64 The 
government’s experience with the social cost of carbon is potentially 
illustrative. For many years, federal agencies did not estimate the 
monetary benefits of reducing carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas, until 
various legal challenges prompted agencies to reconsider their 
practices. In 2008, for example, the Ninth Circuit considered the 
DOT’s corporate average fuel economy standards for light trucks.65 
The court determined that the DOT had not attempted to measure 
the benefits from the expected reduction in carbon emissions despite 
factoring in the regulation’s costs.66 The court thus found the CBA to 
 
 61. See, e.g., Alois Stutzer & Bruno S. Frey, Stress That Doesn’t Pay: The Commuting 
Paradox, 110 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 339 (2008); see also Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, 
supra note 2, at 1626–27. 
 62. See, e.g., Andreas Knabe, Steffen Rätzel, Ronnie Schöb & Joachim Weimann, 
Dissatisfied with Life but Having a Good Day: Time-Use and Well-Being of the Unemployed, 120 
ECON. J. 867 (2010); Richard E. Lucas, Andrew E. Clark, Yannis Georgellis & Ed Diener, 
Unemployment Alters the Set Point for Life Satisfaction, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 8 (2004). 
 63. See Matthew Adler & Eric A. Posner, Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
37 J. LEGAL STUD. S253, S281–84 (2008). 
 64. Note that OIRA “continues to investigate the relevant [SWB] literature and to explore, 
in a preliminary way, its possible implications for improving regulatory policy in ways that 
promote the goals of economic growth, innovation, competitiveness, and job creation.” See 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2011 REPORT TO CONGRESS 
ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON 
STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 42–46 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2011_cb/2011_cba_report.pdf. 
 65. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 
1180 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 66. Id. at 1198–99. 
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be arbitrary and capricious, stating that the agency could not “put a 
thumb on the scale by undervaluing the benefits and overvaluing the 
costs of more stringent standards.”67 For these and other reasons, it 
remanded the rule back to the agency.68 
Soon thereafter, a number of other agencies sought to estimate 
the social cost of carbon and, in doing so, wrestled with the 
underlying conceptual and methodological issues in revealingly 
different ways. For example, the EPA’s 2008 advance notice of 
proposed rulemaking to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean 
Air Act discussed a range of relevant issues, including the EPA’s 
belief that the global (in addition to the domestic) benefits should be 
considered.69 In the EPA’s words, “[e]stimates of global benefits 
capture more of the full value to society than domestic estimates and 
can therefore help guide policies towards higher global net benefits” 
for greenhouse gas reductions.70 The EPA accordingly presented a 
“very preliminary” range of global mean estimates from $68 and $40 
per ton (at 2 and 3 percent discount rates) and a domestic mean value 
of $4 and $1 per ton at the same discount rates.71  The agency was 
careful to note that its analysis was necessarily “incomplete” given 
that “current methods” could only provide a “partial accounting” of 
the possible consequences of climate change.72  
By contrast, the Department of Energy (DOE) chose to consider 
only the domestic (as opposed to global) effects of potential carbon 
dioxide reductions from its rule regulating air conditioners and heat 
pumps.73 The agency cited an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) study, which noted that the large range of benefit 
estimates in the literature stemmed from disagreements about 
 
 67. Id. at 1198, 1200. 
 68. Id. at 1227. 
 69. See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 
44,354, 44,415–16 (proposed July 30, 2008). 
 70. Id. at 44,415. 
 71. Id. at 44,416, 44,446. These figures were presented in 2006 real dollars. Id. at 44,416. See 
also INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, TECHNICAL SUPPORT 
DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866, at 3 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/oms/climate/ 
regulations/scc-tsd.pdf. 
 72. See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. at 
44,416. 
 73. See Energy Conservation Program for Commercial and Industrial Equipment: 
Packaged Terminal Air Conditioner and Packaged Terminal Heat Pump Energy Conservation 
Standards, 73 Fed. Reg. 58,772, 58,773, 58,813 (Oct. 7, 2008) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 431). 
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“climate sensitivity, response lags, the treatment of risk and equity, 
economic and non-economic impacts, the inclusion of potentially 
catastrophic losses, and discount rates.”74 Citing data limitations and 
the lack of consensus on U.S. benefits estimates, DOE thus relied 
upon a meta-analysis of global estimates as the upper bound for its 
domestic values75 and eventually settled on a range of $0 to $20 per 
ton of carbon emissions.76   
In this manner, various individual agencies internally debated the 
social cost of carbon in the context of specific rulemakings after being 
prompted to do so by the courts. In 2009, however, the executive 
branch under President Obama drew upon these disparate 
experiences when convening the Interagency Working Group on 
Social Cost of Carbon. Members of this group represented the DOE 
and the EPA, as well as the Council of Economic Advisers; Council 
on Environmental Quality; Department of Agriculture; Department 
of Commerce; Department of Transportation; National Economic 
Council; Office of Energy and Climate Change; Office of 
Management and Budget; Office of Science and Technology Policy; 
and the Department of the Treasury.77 These agency experts met 
regularly to discuss the relevant literature, public comments, and 
different modeling assumptions.78 The interagency group initially 
proposed a range of interim values for the social cost of carbon that 
focused on global estimates,79  which were then used in a number of 
proposed and final rules.80  In 2010, the group released a final report 
with estimates in 2007 dollars of $5, $21, $35, and $65,81 reflecting 
various discount rates and assumptions.82   
 
 74. Id. (quoting Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report: The Long-Term Perspective, 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and 
_data/ ar4/ syr/en/spms5.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2013)). 
 75. Id. 
 76.  These estimates were in 2007 real dollars. See id. at 58,814; see also INTERAGENCY 
WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, supra note 71, at 3. 
 77. See INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, supra note 71, at 1–3. 
 78. Id. at 2. 
 79. Id. at 10 (“Because of the distinctive nature of the climate change problem, we center 
our current attention on a global measure of SCC [social cost of carbon].”). 
 80. Id. at 4. 
 81. These values were for 2010 and expressed in 2007 real dollars. Id. at 3. 
 82. Specifically, the “first three estimates are based on the average social cost of carbon 
across models . . . at the 5, 3, and 2.5 percent discount rates, respectively.” The fourth value 
represented worst-case scenarios involving “higher-than-expected impacts from temperature 
change.” Id. 
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Through these executive branch efforts, multiple agencies 
brought their perspectives and expertise to bear in deliberative 
meetings to narrow disagreements, including over the use of global 
versus domestic values. Critics of the interim results, in turn, have 
expressed concern that the social cost of carbon estimates could 
eventually be used by Congress at some point as the basis for an 
eventual carbon tax or permit price.83 Whether likely in reality or not 
(especially given recent failed legislative efforts), the overall dynamic 
demonstrates the ways in which individual agencies’ confrontations 
with difficult valuation issues can eventually lead to more centralized 
executive branch efforts that draw upon those experiences, which 
may, in turn, help inform future legislative debates and so on. 
CONCLUSION 
The field of subjective well-being is growing quickly, but many 
conceptual and methodological issues remain unresolved. The 
resulting debates, of the kind occasioned by this symposium, will vary 
in substance and constituency depending on the policymaking 
institutions within which they occur. Different institutions may well 
reach different conclusions on issues of deep disagreement that, in 
turn, can produce a fruitful dialogue. This Commentary has argued 
that resolution of SWB’s most contentious issues will eventually 
come, if at all, through these dynamic processes that help settle 
otherwise intractable disputes. 
These institutional interactions will be iterative and multi-
layered. Congress may pass statutes through costly internal 
procedures that resolve the ends to pursue (clean water, safe working 
environments) and the relevant tradeoffs, if any. When Congress fails 
or declines to decide these issues, the executive branch itself operates 
under texts that can help settle matters for executive agencies and 
also provide optional guidance for the independent agencies. When 
internal executive branch processes leave open these analytical 
questions, then individual agencies will fill the gaps through guidance 
documents that are then applied to the contours of individual 
rulemakings.  Each juncture of this institutional dialogue, in turn, 
presents forums for broader participation by different constituencies, 
whether through notice-and-comment, legislative hearings, litigation, 
 
 83. See FRANK ACKERMAN & ELIZABETH A. STANTON, THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON: 
A REPORT FOR THE ECONOMICS FOR EQUITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT NETWORK 3 (2010), 
available at http://sei-us.org/Publications_PDF/SEI-E3-SocialCostCarbon-10.pdf. 
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or elections more broadly. Perhaps fittingly, these opportunities may 
themselves turn out to have positive effects on subjective well-being.84 
 
 
 84. See Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Beyond Outcomes: Measuring Procedural Utility, 57 
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 90, 105–06 (2005) (finding that reported SWB increases with the right 
to participate in the political decisionmaking process, though not with actual participation 
itself); Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Happiness, Economy and Institutions, 110 ECON. J. 918, 
918 (2000) (finding empirically that institutional factors such as direct participation and local 
autonomy “systematically and sizeably raise self-reported individual well-being”). 
